The Invasion of Abyssinia Begins

It was on this day in 1935 at 5am that Italian forces under the command of General Emilio De Bono marched across the frontier into Abyssinia in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. As one of the Quadrumvirs who led the March on Rome, the seminal event in the history of the "Fascist Revolution" but also a staunch monarchist who gave his first loyalty to the King, De Bono was chosen to lead this campaign because Mussolini wanted it to showcase Fascist military might. There would be a Fascist general in charge and the Blackshirts of the MVSN would make up the bulk of the ground forces initially involved, all with the intention of showing that the new, Fascist, Italy had prevailed in Ethiopia where Crispi's Italy had failed. Since De Bono was also a hero of the Great War and known to be an Italian patriot and loyal to the King, the Duce could expect no problems in the choice from the palace.

Unfortunately, many people have taken a very critical view of General De Bono and this seems, looking at the plain facts, to be rather unjust. His invasion of Abyssinia was a success, it simply did not proceed as rapidly as Mussolini wanted. General De Bono crossed into Abyssinian territory, captured several important positions, announced the abolition of slavery (something which is seldom recognized) and even accepted the surrender of the Ethiopian Emperor's son-in-law, some of whose troops even switched to join the Italian side. General De Bono advanced from the north out of Eritrea while General Graziani advanced from the south out of Italian Somaliland. There were to move methodically until all Ethiopian resistance was crushed between them. However, Mussolini wanted a swift, stunning sort of war which is not what General De Bono had in mind at all. Remembering well the horrific casualties of World War I, De Bono intended to fight a cautious and mostly defensive war in order to conserve the lives of his soldiers while inflicting greater losses on his enemies.

The plan General De Bono had was for the Italian forces to advance into Abyssinia slowly, taking, so to speak, one step at a time. They would move forward, stop, consolidate their lines on a strong, defensive front and then when the enemy attacked, having their primary asset in their huge numbers of Ethiopian soldiers, they could be wiped out by the machine guns and supporting artillery of the Italian lines with minimal losses for themselves. In the aftermath, the lines would be carefully advanced again, another defensive position taken up and then allow the Ethiopians to smash themselves to death again an impenetrable wall of Italian fire. There was nothing wrong with this plan, it was a plan for a slow, cautious advance that would keep Italian losses to a minimum and would end in certain victory. However, Mussolini was also correct in wanting the campaign to be more swift and not just because of his own impatience. The sanctions placed on Italy by the League of Nations meant that Italy could have been economically ruined by a long war and most experts thought that it would take Italy at least two years to conquer Abyssinia if it could be conquered at all without economic collapse at home and the fall of Mussolini's Fascist government. That was a real concern so it was not without some legitimate reasons that General Emilio De Bono was, properly, awarded the rank of Marshal of Italy and then removed from his position with the regular army General Pietro Badoglio taking over to lead a much more swift and aggressive campaign.

In the end, it all worked out and Ethiopia was conquered in an astonishing seven months time with Badoglio leading the Italian troops into the Abyssinian capitol. However, just because the new strategy worked, does not mean that De Bono's plan was necessarily wrong.

The Great War in Italian Africa

The struggle for Africa in World War I is a subject not widely known. Among those who are aware of it, most are familiar with the campaigns by the Allies to seize control of the German colonies in Africa; Togoland, Kamerun, German Southwest Africa and most especially German East Africa where a small band of German colonial troops held out until the end of the war, evading or defeating forces vastly superior to their own. Yet, these were not the only areas of Africa touched by the Great War and the focus on Germany diverts attention away from another of the Central Powers that had big plans for African expansion and that was, of course, the Ottoman Empire. If the Great War had gone in favor of the Central Powers the Ottoman Empire was anxious to reclaim control of North Africa and East Africa from Egypt-Sudan to the Horn of Africa. Although the British were successful in stopping the Turkish efforts to invade Egypt, the Turks were energetic in forging alliances with Islamic groups already in rebellion in northern and eastern Africa against the friends and armed forces of the Kingdom of Italy.

Even before war broke out in Europe, Italian colonial forces were engaged in North Africa, fighting against Sanussi rebels. Italy had gained the three north African provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan after defeating the Ottoman Empire in a war in 1911-1912 and ever since there had been periodic rebellions in the form of attacks on Italian settlements and Italian farmers mostly by members of the Sanussi sect, a tribe and religious order of the Sufi branch of Islam. The Sanussi had been fighting the French in Chad but moved to attack the Italians as soon as the three provinces were handed over to Italy by the Turks. Ultimately, of course, these three provinces would be grouped together by Italy and named Libya, restoring the old Roman title for the area. Since most know it as that, for the sake of simplicity this region will be henceforth referred to as Libya here even though it would not become the official name until 1934. In February of 1914 the Italians began an offensive against Sanussi camps and punitive raids continued until late in the year. However, the number of Italian colonial forces was limited and these were stretched over an immense area.

In August, an Italian column was attacked and defeated by Sanussi rebels at Bir al-Fatia. Subsequently, there was a massive uprising in Fezzan, home of the Sanussi holy city of Kufra. The “supreme leader” of the Sanussi was, at this time, Ahmed Sharif as-Senussi and he would lead or direct his forces in attacks on the French, Italians and British throughout this period. The rebellion became so severe that the Italian forces had to withdraw to Tripolitania by early 1915. To make matters worse, the “Dervishes” of Italian Somaliland in East Africa were becoming increasingly aggressive and clashing with Italian or Italian-allied Somali forces in 1915. These so-called “Dervishes” were the followers of the “Mad Mullah” (who was actually not a mullah at all) Muhammad Abd Allah Hassan. Already, in 1914, he had caused considerable problems for the British in British Somaliland, defeating or at least bloodying British colonial forces in a number of clashes before moving across the border into Italian territory. Meanwhile, back in north Africa, a see-saw campaign, similar to what would later be seen in World War II was unfolding.

Early March, 1915 saw Italian troops defeat (or disperse without much actual combat) a large Sanussi force gathering in southern Tripolitania. Eager to follow this up, a large Italian column set out eastward in the hope of crushing the Sanussi rebellion in the area of Surt. However, on April 28-29 they were soundly defeated by a massive rebel attack at Abu Zinaf. The tide of war swung back in favor of the rebels and from May to June they had besieged Italian garrisons at Banu Walid and Tarhunah, preventing all relief efforts by other Italian forces. May also saw the formal entry of the Kingdom of Italy into the First World War on the Allied side. This had positive and negative effects for the war in Africa. While, Italy gained allies who were as equally threatened in the region, it also meant that Italian military strength would have to be concentrated almost entirely on the border with Austria with the result that the already hard-pressed troops in the colonies would be reduced to a bare minimum. In the summer, another attempt to relieve the siege of Banu Walid failed and when the garrison, driven to desperation, tried a breakout they were overwhelmed. Southern Tripolitania was abandoned  and by October all Italian forces in Cyrenaica as well were withdrawn to the coast.

Obviously, a major change had taken place and that was that the Ottoman Empire had begun to arm the rebels in the hope of eventually retaking their former provinces and reestablishing control of northern Africa. In spite of the fact that, at the time, Italy was only at war with Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire was effectively waging a proxy war against the Italians and Germany was also helping them do it, using German U-boats to smuggle weapons to the Libyan insurgents. In retaliation, on August 21 the Kingdom of Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire (Italy would not declare war on Germany until the following year). By the end of 1915, things looked bleak for the Italian position in north Africa. There had never been much of a real presence in Fezzan and Italian forces in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica had been forced to abandon their interior positions and concentrate their modest forces on the coast in the major towns and port cities. 1916, however, would open with another change in fortunes for the Italians in Libya. In the early months, alarmed by the radicalism of the rebels, the coastal population rallied to the side of the Italians in Tripolitania and Jabal Nafusah. Sanussi control was restricted to the area east of Wadi Zamzam. On February 1, 1916 the Italians were able to strike back for a change and wipe out a Sanussi rebel column.

Lij Jasu

As the year war on and the tide seemed to be turning in Libya, events were growing worse in East Africa. The “Mad Mullah” Muhammad Abd Allah Hassan formed an alliance in May with Emperor Lij Jasu of Ethiopia who had reportedly converted to Islam. Both hoped to achieve their goals of expansion across the Horn of Africa by allying with the Ottoman Empire, placing Ethiopia and Somalia under the spiritual authority of the Ottoman Sultan, the Caliph of Islam. The “Mad Mullah”, the Ethiopian Emperor and the Ottoman Turks formed an alliance to wage war against the British, French and Italian presence in the region. The Ottomans had already been smuggling weapons into the area from southern Arabia across the Gulf of Aden. However, neither of their two allies were in total control of any country or colony. Hassan was already a wanted man by both Britain and Italy and the flirtation with Islam by Lij Jasu did not go over well in Ethiopia. Forces opposed to him declared him deposed and Ethiopia descended into another civil war. Italy rushed reinforcements to Eritrea, the oldest Italian colony in the region, to maintain security and plans were drawn up for a more vigorous colonial strategy.

In May of 1916 Italian troops launched a counter-offensive in Libya with an amphibious landing at Ras al-Muraysah in Cyrenaica that results in the recapture of al-Bardi after which another Italian column, in a joint operation with the British, destroy a major Sanussi camp near Darnah. The British became involved since, with the outbreak of World War I, the Sanussi leader Ahmed Sharid as-Senussi had invaded Egypt, capturing Sallum and provoking the British to strike back and take the Sanussi threat more seriously. Now, however, the Allies were advancing and later that month Italian forces retook Zuwarah in Tripolitania. They were so successful that, by July, the Sanussi agreed to meet for talks with the British and Italians about making peace. Some decide to lay down their arms but others do not and in early 1917 the Italian forces resumed their offensive, clearing the rebels west of Tripoli and completely retaking southern Tripolitania. At the same time, in East Africa, the “Mad Mullah” attacks the Sultan Uthman of Obbia who is allied with Italy but the forces of the Sultan soundly defeat him.

Back in Libya, the Sanussi finally agree to come to terms with Italy and Great Britain, promising to recognize their authority and cease hostilities. However, some rebel groups simply denounce the Sanussi leadership that made the agreement and carrying on fighting anyway. Because of this, retaliation against these post-peace agreement rebels would often be quite severe. Throughout the rest of the year the restoration of Italian rule over Tripolitania continued at a steady pace while in East Africa the Sultan of Obbia launched his own counter-offensive against the “Mad Mullah”, winning another victory. 1918 saw an unbroken string of Italian victories across Libya with the rebels only managing to launch one major attack which was repelled by the colonial troops while taking heavy losses. In East Africa, the much vaunted threat of a Muslim takeover of the Horn of Africa came to nothing as local forces friendly to Italy proved capable of handling things on their own in Somalia while in Ethiopia, the deposed Emperor Lij Jasu ended up fighting for his own throne rather than waging a war of conquest against the French, British and Italian colonies.

Italian rule was restored and secured across the Italian African colonies. However, peace would not be permanent and it would take another major campaign before Libya was pacified in 1932. Ahmed Sharif as-Senussi left Libya in 1918 for the Ottoman Empire via Austria-Hungary, leaving the peace negotiations with his cousin Mohammad Idris who would, for a short time, become King of Libya after World War II. In Ethiopia, Lij Jasu (or Iyasu V) was deposed in favor of his aunt Empress Zewditu who kept him safe and tried to have him reconciled with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church which had excommunicated him. However, Empress Zewditu was suppressed by Haile Selassie who made himself Emperor and finally had Lij Jasu killed during another war with Italy. The “Mad Mullah” took his fight back to British territory, was soundly defeated and died of influenza in 1920.

The Sicilian Kingdom of Africa

King Roger II

To hear many modern commentators, even some claiming to be historians, speak about the expansion of the Kingdom of Italy into North Africa in the early years of the last century, one would think that Italian troops had never set foot on the continent before. Any Italian alive during the colonization of Libya, for example, would have laughed at such an idea. The Italian presence in northern Africa goes back, of course, to the time of ancient Rome but, more than that, even after the fall of the Roman Empire, Italian forces were never long absent from the “fourth shore”. The Italian acquisition of the provinces that became Libya as well as the frustration at the colonization of Tunisia by France are often painted today as simple aggression, yet, when one understands the very long history of close Italian association with this region one can see why, when the Kingdom of Italy began to colonize at least part of northern Africa, the Italians were not “arriving” but rather “returning” to lands that had long been ruled from the Italian peninsula. One of the most overlooked periods that serves as one example was that of the Kingdom of Africa under the Norman King of Sicily Roger II.

The story, starts much earlier, with Norman-Sicilian forces making forays into northern Africa in 1123; the first of many. Even then, Count Roger I of Sicily was already keeping troops in Mahdia in Tunisia to collect export duties. By 1135 King Roger II already had what amounted to a defacto Sicilian protectorate over most of the north African cities closest to southern Italy based simply on their economic interdependence. Having conquered Pantelleria in 1123, Roger II captured the pirate island of Djerba in 1135. By 1142 he established a protectorate over Mahdia after they were unable to make their grain payments on time. The local emir remained on the throne but was forced to accept the King of Sicily as his overlord as he had already become deeply beholden to Roger II because of the vast sums of money he had borrowed from him. In 1146 Norman-Sicilian forces captured Tripoli which, after suffering a terrible famine, had fallen into civil war. After that, numerous other local chieftains came forward to recognize Roger II as their overlord, valuing the security and economic prosperity that came with association with the Kingdom of Sicily. In 1148 Norman troops led by George of Antioch conquered Tunisia after the emir of Mahdia rose against Roger II. The Sicilian forces soon took control of the entire north African coast between Bona and Tripoli.

The strongest support for Sicilian rule came from the Christian minority in north Africa and these people still spoke a local variation of Latin and were actually the remnants of the original population from the time of the old Roman Empire. This is something to keep in mind when people dismiss Italy pointing to the Roman roots of the Italian imperial presence. The links of the chain go right back to Rome and the original Roman communities lasted much longer than most realize. In any event, under Sicilian rule, the economy of north Africa prospered and there was a measure of religious freedom too. Once he took direct control of the area, Muslims had to pay a special tax for their right to worship, just as the Christians had been forced to do previously when under Islamic rule. However, it was less than the tax imposed on the Muslim refugees living on the island of Sicily itself. This was because the King wanted to encourage the Muslims in Sicily to resettle in north Africa, both to remove them from Sicily and because their presence would help show their co-religionists the way forward.

The rulers of Tunis feared a Sicilian attack and sent Roger II tribute in an effort to persuade him to desist (so that their own rule could continue) but, although he had planned further expansions in Africa, the King was diverted by a war with the Byzantines and died in 1154 without returning to his ambition to restore the former Roman lands of Africa to Christian rule. Roger II was succeeded by his son King William I and the reign of King William I was one marked by rebellions on the part of local nobles, both in the Kingdom of Sicily and the Kingdom of Africa. In Africa it came in the face of the rising power of the Almohad Caliphate out of Morocco. The local Muslim rulers were discontented because the Sicilians gave them little autonomy when it came to taxation and, as has long been the case the world over, whoever collects the taxes tends to become quite rich (somehow). With the Almohad forces gaining strength on the horizon, many decided to change allegiance, turn against the Sicilians and appeal to the Almohad Caliphate for protection.

At first, King William I was successful in suppressing native rebellions and even struck out at the Egyptian coast and launched raids on the Muslim-held Balearic Islands in an effort to disrupt the supply lines of the Almohad invasion force he knew was coming (already Christian refugees were pouring into Sicilian Africa as the Almohad forces advanced). However, the Sicilian position was quickly seen as a lost cause. The loyalty of local leaders could not be counted on, supplies were low from all the recent conflict and the Almohad forces seemed unstoppable. Soon, almost everything in north Africa had been abandoned save for Mahdia in Tunisia. In 1158 Tripoli fell and the following year Mahdia was besieged. It held out until January of 1160 when the walls were breached and the city taken. The conquerors gave the local Christian population a simple choice: convert to Islam or be executed. Christendom tended to blame King William for the atrocities, for not fighting harder to defend the Kingdom of Africa. Under the circumstances, however, there was little he could have done and few were willing to support him at the time. Indeed, many Christian powers had long been jealous of the success of King Roger II and his grand aspirations. Eventually, under King William II, Sicily and the Almohad Caliphate even became allies of a sort as they battled other Islamic forces that posed a threat to both of them.

Italian Disaster in Africa

The battle of Adowa is one of the most famous yet often misunderstood battles fought by Italy on the continent of Africa. Usually Italy is portrayed as the aggressive would-be conqueror and the Ethiopians as the hapless, innocent victims of foreign imperialism. As with most things, the truth is neither. The First Italo-Abyssinian War was the result of a misunderstanding and it was Ethiopia that made the first move. Moreover, Adowa was the one major defeat in a war which had previously been dominated by Italian victories. Prime Minister Francesco Crispi, with the support of King Umberto I, had been anxious to ensure that Italy was not totally left out of the colonial race going on at that time. Italy was also newly united and had yet to prove herself on the international stage. In contrast, Ethiopia was a complex network of tribes, often at war with each other and nominally under the rule of a “King of Kings” or Emperor but whose actual control over the country tended to be intermittent. In 1869 an Italian company purchased land for a coaling station in Assab Bay and in 1883 sold the territory to the Italian government. This area eventually became the colony of Eritrea. There were clashes with the religious rebels of Mohammed Ahmed, who claimed to be the “Mahdi” or Islamic messiah (basically the Islamic terrorists of the day) in the Sudan as well as clashes with Ethiopians as the Italians moved farther inland.

Emperor Menelik II

The nominal ruler of Abyssinia, Ethiopian Emperor Yohannes IV (who had sided with the British in a clash with a previous “King of Kings” in exchange for weapons which helped him seize power) clashed with the Italians but eventually came to terms with them. Meanwhile, one of his leading nobles, Menelik of Shewa, was building up his forces, making use of modern weapons sold to him by the Italians in return for his neutrality during the conflict with Yohannes IV. When the Emperor was on his deathbed he named his nephew, Ras Mangasha as his heir in 1889. In Abyssinia, power rarely changed hands peacefully and the throne usually went to whoever was strong enough to take it. In 1889 it was Menelik who controlled the best land, had the most men and who had the most advanced weaponry. When Yohannes IV died the ruler of Shewa declared himself Emperor Menelik II and negotiated Italian support for his seizure of power. Anxious to avoid being drawn into local conflicts and confident that Menelik was their ally, Italy signed the Treaty of Wuchale on May 2, 1889 by which Rome recognized Menelik as Emperor of Ethiopia in return for which he recognized Italian ownership of Eritrea. Permanent friendship was pledged and trade agreements established, however, confusion over one clause in the treaty would ultimately lead to war.

Ras Mangasha

Article 17 was the cause of the trouble as it was different in the Italian and Ethiopian versions. According to the Italian version Menelik II had basically agreed that Ethiopia was an Italian protectorate. In the Ethiopian version the Emperor had the option to avail himself of Italian protection but no clear obligation to do so. When Menelik II sought agreements with other European powers Italy objected. Emperor Menelik II was offended by this and sent a letter of protest to King Umberto I of Italy. When the King failed to respond satisfactorily, Menelik II repudiated the Treaty of Wuchale, effectively declaring war on the Kingdom of Italy on February 27, 1893. After dealing with the forces of the Mahdi, who clashed with the Ethiopians and Italians alike, the focus shifted to the important province of Tigre. Menelik II, hoping to make an ally out of the man he had displaced, offered the province to Ras Mangasha if he could take it from the Italians. Ras Mangasha pretended to be friendly with the Italians and raised an army on the pretense of fighting the forces of the Mahdi. However, once gathered, he launched a surprise attack on the Italians. Mangasha was defeated but the fight resulted in Italy being drawn into a larger and more risky confrontation.

General Baratieri

Major General Oreste Baratieri was dispatched with a large Italian colonial army, most of the rank and file being native African troops under Italian command. He won a number of early victories while Emperor Menelik II spent his time gathering a massive army from across Ethiopia. Both armies fought a proxy war and played for time until they were each forced into a confrontation due to dwindling supplies. The feudal levies of the Ethiopian army could not be kept in the field, inactive for long and General Baratieri was being pushed by the government in Rome for a swift and decisive victory. Baratieri, a veteran of Garibaldi’s red shirts and a respected soldier, suspected treachery and wished to pull back but all of his subordinates insisted on advancing. The two armies moved and came together near the town of Adowa. Italian reinforcements had been dispatched to Africa but would not arrive in time and General Baratieri had no idea of how large an army was massed against him. He had expected, at most, about 60,000 men when in fact Menelik II was able to field over 100,000 warriors compared to only about 15,000 Italian colonial troops. Exact figures are not known but the Italians would be outnumbered at least 8 to 1 by most accounts.

Contrary to popular belief, the Ethiopians were not a purely primitive army. They had Russian military advisors, many warriors carried rifles and his army even possessed some artillery. In some cases, their imported weapons were even superior than what the Italian army had to work with. Deception and trickery were also well utilized by the Ethiopians. Most of the scouts working for the Italians were actually in the employ of Menelik II and he used other means to trick the Italians into thinking his army was mostly dispersed. The Italians had also underestimated Menelik II himself. They had hoped to influence local chieftains against him or to at least secure their neutrality (as they had previously done with Menelik himself) but this time it didn’t work. Menelik II, upon taking the throne, passed what we might call ’tax cuts for the rich’, ending requirements of feudal tribute to ensure the nobility would support him and the vast majority did exactly that. He moved his army forward while the Italians, unfamiliar with the terrain and being fed bad information by their native scouts, stumbled about in the dark and became separated.

As the Italian forces advanced on a night march the units became mixed up, setting back their timetable and a misunderstanding over the name of a certain hill caused General Matteo Albertone, commanding the leading Native Brigade, to advance far beyond the rest of the army. This caused something of a chain-reaction as the next brigade, told to take their place alongside Albertone, also became separated. By the time Emperor Menelik II sent his warriors charging against the enemy on the morning of March 1, 1896 the Italian forces were perfectly placed to be wiped out by the Ethiopians one piece at a time. In terms of the forces engaged, this was almost a purely African battle with the Italians involved being a minority. The African natives of the Italian army fought with remarkable discipline against tremendous odds, holding their positions and delivering devastating volleys of fire that took an immense toll on the attackers. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian warriors were relentless in their ferocity and attacked again and again. As the day wore on the Ethiopians finally overwhelmed the Italians, destroying or routing the entire brigade. General Albertone himself was killed in the struggle, fighting to the death.

Of the four Italian brigades, one was annihilated and another already close to the same fate when General Baratieri realized none of his messages had gotten through or if they had, lack of knowledge of the terrain meant they had not been properly followed. He tried to organize a strong defensive position in the center of his intended battle line but, for the most part, by that time it was too little and too late. Fleeing troops overran these positions with Ethiopian warriors hot on their heels and despite some heroic stands the Italian position began to totally disintegrate. General Vittorio Dabormida, commanding the brigade sent to the relief of Albertone, was trapped and wiped out by Ethiopian forces. Virtually the entire brigade was destroyed and again, the commanding general was among the dead, struck down while using his saber in close combat after being surrounded and overrun by enemy warriors.

General Baratieri tried to pull off a fighting withdrawal, and some units held off a few attacks, but this proved impossible and soon the entire army, or at least what was left of it, was in retreat. Emperor Menelik II called upon the local population to rise up against his enemies and many more Italians and colonial troops were killed after falling behind, collapsing from exhaustion or becoming lost during the retreat. Thus many men had their throats cut as they lay helpless on the roadside by peasants from nearby villages. Some faced even worse fates. In all the Italians had lost 6,133 men either killed in the battle or slaughtered during the retreat. Another 1,428 were wounded and all 56 pieces of artillery were captured by the Ethiopians. Emperor Menelik II lost about 7,000 men dead and 10,000 wounded; a much greater number certainly but representing only a fraction of his overall strength whereas the Italian losses counted for over half of their total force. Many of the Italian wounded also suffered a more horrific fate, some being killed, some being mutilated as Ethiopians castrated wounded men as grisly war trophies. The African colonial troops often suffered worse as, depending on their origin, many of these men were considered traitors by the Ethiopians and had one hand and one foot cut off so as to make them permanently helpless and, in most cases, doomed to a slow, agonizing death from starvation.

General Baratieri

The results of the battle were immediate and dramatic. In Rome the government of Francesco Crispi immediately fell and General Baratieri was wrongly blamed of abandoning his men in disgrace. Fortunately, he was cleared by a court martial but his reputation had suffered irreparable harm. All Italian colonial expansion in Africa was halted for more than a decade and total Ethiopian independence was recognized. Emperor Menelik II made this his only real demand. While others howled for more blood, he realized that provoking an all-out war might have resulted in the loss of his throne and the total ruination of his country. He had gained what he wanted, achieved near god-like status among the Africans and was content to leave well enough alone. He felt himself so superior to his fellow Africans that, when questioned about leading a pan-African movement he said, “I wish you the greatest possible success. But in coming to me to take the leadership, you are knocking at the wrong door, so to speak. You know, I am not a Negro at all. I am a Caucasian.”

That exchange, of course, would be forgotten by those who wished to seize on the battle of Adowa as a symbol of African racial prowess. One thing the battle did was to ensure that the Italians would not underestimate the Ethiopians next time; and Italy was determined that there would be a next time when the defeat of Adowa would be avenged. When the next contest came it would be the Ethiopians who, remembering their victory at Adowa, would tend to underestimate the Italians with disastrous results. The next time the two countries went to war, Italy would be fully prepared, leaving nothing to chance and would see all of Ethiopia conquered in seven months after which King Vittorio Emanuele III was declared Emperor.